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THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ECSC-CARTEL 
PROHIBITION (ARTICLE 65) DURING A 
"MANIFEST CRISIS"t 
Ernst-Joachim Mestmiicker* 
I. THE ISSUE 
The Commission and the Council have found that the steel industry of 
the Community is facing a "manifest crisis"1 within the meaning of article 
58 of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty.2 Factors 
that have led to this crisis include structural peculiarities of the steel indus-
try, an increase in production costs, a decrease in demand for steel and steel 
products, and the resulting excess capacity in steel mills. A majority of the 
Member States have attempted to protect their national steel industries 
from the economically mandated cutback in production capacity through 
substantial subsidization. International competition has thus degenerated, 
in significant respects, into competition through subsidies. The anti-subsidy 
provisions of article 4 of the ECSC Treaty have done nothing to prevent 
this development, but the reasons for their ineffectiveness are not the sub-
ject of this Article. 
The collapse in steel prices that has resulted from excess capacity and 
efforts by undertakings3 to recover only a portion of their overhead costs, 
while abandoning any hope of full cost recovery, has induced the Commu-
nity to accept certain measures aimed at combatting the structural crisis 
facing the steel industry. Among these measures are anticompetitive agree-
ments among steel undertakings. The resort to concerted and voluntary 
action by undertakings has become a nearly routine component of the 
Community's steel policy. Price-fixing agreements, the focus of this Article, 
mark the high point in this development. The behavior of Community in-
t The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Rosemary T. Rakas, guest 
at the Max Planck Institute, in translating this Article from the German original. 
• Direktor, Max Planck Institut ftlr Ausl!indisches und Intemationales Privatrecht, 
Hamburg, West Germany. - Ed. 
1. S.p.A. Ferriera Valsabbia v. Commission of the Eur. Communities (Case No. 154/78), 
1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 907, 996-97. 
2. Treaty instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, art. 58, 261 
U.N.T.S. 140 (1957) reprinted in Treaties Establishing the European Communities #13 (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as ECSC Treaty]. 
3. In the official English translation of the ECSC Treaty, the term "undertaking" is em-
ployed to describe those entities subject to the provisions of the Treaty; such will be the usage 
of this term throughout this Article. The term is defined in article 80 of the ECSC Treaty as 
"any undertaking engaged in production in the coal or the steel industry" within the Common 
Market. ECSC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 80. For the purposes of articles 65 and 66, the defini-
tion is expanded to include "any undertaking or agency regularly engaged in distribution other 
than sale to domestic consumers or small craft industries." ECSC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 80. 
For a further discussion of the concept of "undertaking," see Mannesmann AG v. High Au-
thority of the ECSC (Case No. 19/61), 1962 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 357, 371-72. 
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stitutions permits the conclusion that, under the current conditions in the 
steel market, they do not feel obligated to apply the prohibition of article 65 
of the ECSC Treaty, which bars certain anticompetitive agreements.4 In-
stead, anticompetitive agreements have been required and officially em-
ployed as a means of combatting the crisis by Community institutions. Yet 
the legality of participation by undertakings in such agreements depends on 
whether such actions by Community institutions are legal. 
4. Art. 65 of the ECSC Treaty, supra note 2, reads as follows: 
I. All agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices tending directly or indirectly to prevent, restrict or distort normal 
competition within the common market shall be prohibited, and in particular those tend-
ing: 
(a) to fix or determine prices; 
(b) to restrict or control production, technical development or investment; 
(c) to share markets, products, customers or sources of supply. 
2. However, the High Authority shall authorise specialisation agreements or joint-buy-
ing or joint-selling agreements in respect of particular products, if it finds that: 
(a) such specialisation or such joint-buying or -selling will make for a substantial im-
provement in the production or distribution of those products; 
{b) the a9reement in question is essential in order to achieve these results and is not 
more restrictive than is necessary for that purpose; and 
(c) the agreement is not liable to give the undertakings concerned the power to deter-
mine the prices, or to control or restrict the production or marketing, of a substantial part 
of the products in question within the common market, or to shield them against effective 
competition from other undertakings within the common market. 
If the High Authority finds that certain agreements are strictly analogous in nature 
and effect to those referred to above, having particular regard to the fact that this para-
graph applies to distributive undertakings, it shall authorise them also when satisfied that 
they meet the same requirements. 
Authorisations may be granted subject to specified conditions and for limited periods. 
In such cases the High Authority shall renew an authorisation once or several times if it 
finds that the requirements ofsubparagraphs (a) to (c) are still met at the time of renewal. 
The High Authority shall revoke or amend an authorisation if it finds that as a result 
of a change in circumstances the agreement no longer meets these requirements, or that 
the actual results of the agreement or of the application thereof are contrary to the re-
quirements for its authorisation. 
Decisions granting, renewing, amending, refusing or revoking an authorisation shall 
be published together with the reasons therefor; the restrictions imposed by the second 
paragraph of Article 47 shall not apply thereto. 
3. The High Authority may, as provided in Article 47, obtain any information needed 
for the application of this Article, either by making a special request to the parties con-
cerned or by means of regulations stating the kinds of agreement, decision or practice 
which must be communicated to it. 
4. Any agreement or decision prohibited by paragraph 1 of this Article shall be automat-
ically void and may not be relied upon before any court or tribunal in the Member States. 
The High Authority shall have sole jurisdiction, subject to the right to bring actions 
before the Court, to rule whether any such agreement or decision is compatible with this 
Article. 
5. On any undertaking which has entered into an agreement which is automatically 
void, or has enforced or attempted to enforce, by arbitration, penalty, boycott or any other 
means, an agreement or decision which is automatically void or an agreement for which 
authorisation has been refused or revoked, or has obtained an authorisation by means of 
information which it knew to be false or misleading, or has engaged in practices prohib-
ited by paragraph 1 of this Article, the High Authority may impose fines or periodic pen-
alty payments not exceeding twice the turnover on the products which were the subject of 
the agreement, decision or practice prohibited by this Article; if, however, the purpose of 
the agreement, decision or practice is to restrict production, technical development or 
investment, this maximum may be raised to 10 per cent of the annual turnover of the 
undertakings in question in the case of fines, and 20 per cent of the daily turnover in the 
case of periodic penalty payments. 
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This evaluation becomes particularly necessary in light of the Commis-
sion's Communication of November 14, 1981, on the goals of its steel pol-
icy. In this Communication the Commission requested steel undertakings 
to increase prices by specific amounts.5 The Commission pointed to article 
3(c) as its rationale. This provision requires the Commission to work to-
wards the establishment of the lowest possible prices, while preserving an 
undertaking's ability to take necessary amortization and its ability to earn 
normal rates of return on invested capital.6 The legality of the Commis-
sion's action here must, however, be viewed in the light of other Treaty 
provisions as well. 
Article 8 requires the Commission to work towards the objectives articu-
lated in the Treaty. However, this duty can only be performed "in accor-
dance with the provisions" of the Treaty.7 Further, article 3 requires 
Community institutions to act only "within the limits of their respective 
powers."8 Finally, article S requires the Community to employ all measures 
necessary "to ensure the observance of the rules laid down in this Treaty."9 
These provisions demonstrate that the Community objectives set forth in 
articles 2 and 3 are not in themselves sources of institutional authority. 10 
They reflect the principle, applicable to every lawful action of public au-
thorities, that the powers of Commission institutions are limited by their 
enabling provisions. This applies not only to the (pure) application of law 
as such, but also to the exercise of enumerated powers. Article 95(3) con-
firms this proposition, as it provides for modification of the rules governing 
the High Authority's exercise of its powers through amendments to the 
Treaty in the event of fundamental economic or technical changes in the 
market for coal and steel. Moreover, the Court of Justice has emphasized 
that, when the Commission is empowered to take extraordinary measures 
that interfere with the workings of a free market, "the provisions of the 
Treaty under which the measure is taken stipulate precisely which articles 
the Commission is obliged to take into account." 11 
It is upon this foundation that the implementation of the pricing policy 
5. "The Commission invites the steel industry to raise its list of prices for bulk prod-
ucts .... " Co=unication from the Commission concerning the objectives of the steel price 
policy, 24 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 294) 3 (Nov. 14, 1981). 
6. Art. 3 of the ECSC Treaty, supra note 2, reads in part: 
The institutions of the Co=unity shall, within the limits of their respective powers, 
in the co=on interest: 
(c) ensure the establishment of the lowest prices under such conditions that these 
prices do not result in higher prices charged by the same undertakings in other transac-
tions or in a higher general price level at another time, while allowing necessary amortiza-
tion and normal return on invested capital . . . . 
7. ECSC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 8. 
8. ECSC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3. 
9. ECSC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5. 
10. See Knopfle, Karte/lrecht der Europliischen Gemeinschqfl far Koh/e und Stahl, in H. 
MOLLER-HENNEBERG, G. SCHWARTZ & W,. BENISCH, GESETZ GEGEN WEITBEWERBS-
BESCHRANKUNGEN UND EUROPAISCHES KARTELLRECHT: GEMEINSCHAFTSKOMMENTAR f I, 
at 2 (4th ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as GEMEINSCHAFTSKOMMENTAR]. 
II. S.p.A. Ferriera Valsabbia v. Commission of the Eur. Co=unities (Case No. 154/78), 
1980 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 907, 1009. 
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of the Community institutions and individual undertakings must be judged. 
Part II of this article seeks to clarify the relationship between the objectives 
of the Community and the particular provisions of the Treaty. The influ-
ence of the current structural crisis on the protection of competition will be 
examined in Part III. Finally, Part IV will discuss the restrictions on the 
Treaty's goal of attaining "normal competitive conditions." 
II. ENDS AND MEANS WITHIN THE SYSTEM OF THE TREATY 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty establish the economic objectives of the 
Community. Article 2 requires the Community to work towards economic 
expansion, growth of employment, and a rising standard of living in the 
Member States "through the establishment of a common market as pro-
vided in Article 4." This foundation also applies to the other goal stated in 
article 2, to "progressively bring about conditions which will of themselves 
ensure the most rational distribution of production at the highest possible 
level of productivity." From this provision it may properly be concluded 
that the Treaty intended competition to be not only a means of achieving 
the economic policies of the Community, but an end in itself. 
However, competition, as a goal, is subject to the progressive develop-
ment of the Common Market. Furthermore, unemployment is to be 
avoided and the Commission must endeavor not to provoke fundamental 
disturbances in the economies of the Member States. Article 4 specifies the 
principle of competition and the duties assigned by article 3 to the Commu-
nity institutions. This provision lists those activities of the Member States 
and undertakings deemed incompatible with the Common Market. It pro-
vides that these practices are to be abolished through measures "provided 
in this Treaty."12 This does not mean that article 4 provides only an un-
binding statement of political intent. To the extent that specific provisions 
are absent, article 4 applies directly; 13 to the extent that the Treaty contains 
specific provisions, article 4 applies in conjunction with them. This is par-
ticularly true of article 4( d). Its prohibition against division or exploitation 
of the markets is given more concrete expression through article 65. 14 
12. Art. 4 of the ECSC Treaty, supra note 2, reads as follows: 
The following are recognised as incompatible with the co=on market for coal and steel 
and shall accordingly be abolished and prohibited within the Community, as provided in 
this Treaty: 
(a) import and export duties, or changes having equivalent effect, and quantitative 
·restrictions on the movement of products; 
(b) measures or practices which discriminate between producers, between purchasers 
or between consumers, especially in prices and delivery terms or transport rates and con-
ditions, and measures or practices which interfere with the purchaser's free choice of sup-
plier; 
(c) subsidies or aids granted by States, or special charges imposed by States, in any 
form whatsoever; 
(d) restrictive practices which tend towards the sharing or exploiting of markets. 
13. Groupement des Industries Siderurgiques Luxembourgeoises v. High Authority of the 
ECSC (Nos. 7, 9/54), 1956 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 175, 195; Jaeger, lJas Kartellverbol, in 
KARTELLVERBOT UNO FUSIONSKONTROLLE IN DER MONTANUNI0N 9, 17 (G. Bernini, J. Jaeger 
& H. Matthies eds. 1972). 
14. Proposed Amendment to Article 65 of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and 
Steel Co=unity, Advisory Opinion No. 1/61, 1961 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 243, 261-62. 
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Article 4 is particularly instructive on the relationship between goals 
and means within the system of the Treaty, because the provision, like the 
policy statements in article 3, may not be changed by the so-called "little 
revision" procedure of article 95(3). It therefore follows, a maiore ad minus, 
that the Community institutions may not disregard article 4 to achieve any 
of the Treaty's goals, absent a specific provision in the Treaty itself. Ac-
cording to the language of the Court of Justice concerning the little revision 
procedure, articles 65(2)(c) and 4(d) are consistent and should be consid-
ered as a whole. 15 
Agreements that violate article 65(2) are incompatible with the Com-
mon Market, regardless of any incidental positive effects they may produce. 
In this respect any differentiation between goals and means is eliminated. 
Thus, any restrictive agreement that permits the participating undertakings 
to agree on prices for a substantial part of the production of the Common 
Market, to control or restrict distribution or marketing, or to insulate their 
productive activities from competition from other firms is absolutely forbid-
den. "This prohibition is of strict application and distinguishes the system 
established by the Treaty." 16 Given this, it must be concluded that the 
Commission, if it encourages or tolerates pricing agreements between steel 
undertakings, is acting illegally. As the following discussion will demon-
strate, the elements that comprise a violation of article 65(2)(c) by the Com-
mission have, in fact, been established. 
Noncompliance with article 4 is permissible only when allowed by the 
Treaty. Such noncompliance may be authorized either by the text of the 
Treaty or, in the case of the establishment of minimum prices, by judicial 
interpretation.17 Noncompliance is not available in cases of the establish-
ment of production quotas. In such cases, according to article 58, articles 2, 
3 and 4 must be taken into account. 18 The Commission remains, in particu-
lar, obligated to comply with article 4(d). 
The very first case before the Court of Justice concerning the ECSC 
Treaty dealt with the relationship between the goals of the Treaty and the 
particular provisions of article 60(2). 19 Article 60(2) requires that price lists 
and conditions of sale used by firms in transactions within the Common 
Market be made public for the purposes articulated in article 60(1), and "to 
the extent and in the manner prescribed by the High Authority after con-
sulting the Consultative Committee."2° For this purpose, article 60(1) re-
fers to articles 2, 3 and 4. 
In its decision interpreting the application of article 60(2), the High Au-
15. 1961 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 261-62. 
16. 1961 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 262. 
17. Noncompliance with article 4 in the case of minimum prices may be authorized by 
judicial interpretation because article 61, which permits limited price fixing, requires only that 
such action be necessary to the objectives set out in article 3. By implication, the price-fixing 
may not be required to meet the standards of article 4. 
18. ESCS Treaty, supra note 2, art. 58(2); see S.p.A. Ferriera Valsabbia v. Commission of 
the Eur. Communities (Case No. 154/78), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 907, 1009. 
19. France v. High Authority of the ECSC (Case No. 1/54), 1954 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. l, 
8-13. 
20. ECSC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 60(2). 
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thority relaxed the universal requirement of the publication of price lists to 
permit a free and market-oriented setting of steel prices and in considera-
tion of actual business practices and business relations.21 The Court ex-
amined whether this weakening of the duty to adhere to published prices 
could be justified, and quickly reached the decision that the Treaty rules are 
mandatory. The Court held that article 60(2) did not permit a relaxation of 
the duty to sell at published prices only. If the High Authority could permit 
such a relaxation, it could also completely eliminate the entire scheme. 
The Court then addressed the issues of whether this result was inconsis-
tent with other objectives of the Treaty or whether it would weaken other 
powers. These questions were answered in the negative: 
The state of the market, in particular the realization that there is a trend to 
lower prices, is likewise no ground for abolishing the rule that prices are to 
be published, since such publication is provided for by the Treaty. In the 
event of a crisis or disturbances on the market, the Treaty confers various 
powers on the High Authority- in particular under Article 60 (2) last line, 
Article 61, Article 63, Articles 58 and 59 - but nowhere the power to dis-
pense with the compulsory publication of price-lists. Moreover, the rule as 
to compulsory publication, laid down by the Treaty, is of a general nature 
and in no wise depends on current market trends.22 
The decision stated unequivocally that application of the mandatory 
provisions of the Treaty was not subject to the Community institutions' dis-
cretion. This applies even if such application produces a conflict with other 
goals of the Treaty. The prohibition against cartels and concerted activities 
is, as is article 60(2), one of the mandatory provisions of the Treaty. The 
Commission may not disregard its duty to apply these provisions in its pur-
suit of other Treaty objectives. 
III. THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION UNDER CONDITIONS OF A 
STRUCTURAL CRISIS 
A. The Resolution of Crises within the System of the Treaty 
Article 65(1) prohibits all agreements and concerted activity that would 
directly or indirectly prevent normal competitive conditions within the 
Common Market. Particularly offensive are agreements concerning price. 23 
Article 65(2) contains exceptions for agreements for specialization or for 
joint purchasing or selling, so long as these agreements contribute to an 
appreciable improvement in production or distribution and provided that 
the anticompetitive obligations of the agreement do not exceed those re-
quired for legitimate purposes. The previously mentioned article 65(2)(c) 
establishes an absolute boundary for the tolerance of cartels. Undertakings 
may not control prices over a significant portion of the Common Market.24 
The ECSC Treaty does not contain a provision, similar to that in section 4 
21. High Authority of the ECSC Decision 54/2, on the publication of price lists and condi-
tions of sale applied by undertakings in the steel industry, [Eng. Special Ed. 1952-1958] O.J. 
EUR. COMM. (No. 1/218) 15 (Jan. 13, 1954). 
22. 1954 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 14. 
23. See ECSC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 65(1) (quoted supra note 4), 
24. See ECSC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 65(2)(c) (quoted supra note 4), 
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of the German Act against Restraints of Competition, 25 dealing with cartels 
during a structural crisis. It does not follow, however, that the ECSC Treaty 
disregarded the particular problems that could arise because of the special 
structure of the coal and steel industries. Such problems were thoroughly 
considered by the Member States at the time the Treaty was concluded, and 
concern for them underlies all the more important Treaty rules. 
On both the national and international level, the coal and steel industry 
has been characterized by a high degree of concentration and cartelization. 
At the beginning of World War II, the steel market was organized into a 
system of related national and international cartels. The level of organiza-
tion in the German steel industry was particularly high. The Unrefined 
Steel Export Community (Rohstahlexportgemeinschaft) was founded in 
1933 and operated until World War IL This group controlled the market in 
continental Europe and was formed for the purpose of regulating prices and 
setting quotas on exports to third countries. The regulation of national 
markets was reserved for national cartels.26 
The stark contrast between the historical market organizations and the 
new regime established by the ECSC Treaty was characterized in a political 
economic study: 
The Treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community fundamentally 
seeks competition through price, a sharp contrast to the cartel accords of 
the time before and between the two World Wars, when price competition 
played no part in the market for raw materials. Nearly independent of 
cyclical developments and for practical purposes undisturbed by foreign 
sources of competition, the price for raw materials assumed the function of 
a fixed exchange rate - just as such rates force an adjustment in the do-
mestic market (quantity regulation). In the export markets alone did price 
retain a certain role as a market supply regulator. Periods of official price 
fixing in the domestic markets further narrowed the policies of the under-
takings. Determined without regard to the market situation, price attained 
the character of a fee rather than of compensation established by the 
marketplace. 27 
It is against this economic background that the competition rules of the 
Treaty and the resulting separation of functions between the Community 
institutions and cartels must be appreciated. 
The steel industry has all the characteristics traditionally regarded as a 
complete justification for cartelization: homogeneous, transport-intensive 
goods; capital-intensive production and a resulting high proportion of fixed 
costs; oligopolistic market structure; and low elasticity of demand. Under 
such conditions, a persistent decline in demand creates a tendency to "ruin-
ous competition," because every sale contributes to the recovery of fixed 
costs so long as the return exceeds average variable cost. Such effects can 
be brought about as easily by a decrease in demand, during a cyclical 
downswing, as from a persistent change in demand. The resulting competi-
tion is looked upon by the undertakings as ruinous and as justifying mea-
25. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrllnkungen § 4, 1980 BGBl I 1761, 1762. 
26. See H. JORGENSEN, DIE WESTEUROPAISCHE MONTANINDUSTRIE UND !HR GEMEIN-
SAMER MARKT 98-102 (1955). 
27. Id. at 190. [Author's translation. - Ed.) 
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sures for self-preservation, such as restrictions in competition and the 
setting of production quotas. An oligopolistic market structure and homo-
geneous, transport-intensive goods facilitate the restriction of competition. 
These peculiarities of competition, in markets such as the steel market, have 
led economists and politicians to justify cartels as "children of distress," 
which, because of the fixed-cost structure of modern industry, are indispen-
sible or harmless.2s 
The ECSC Treaty repudiates this school of thought. Instead, it estab-
lishes an economic order based upon the rule of law.29 The Treaty does 
take into account the special characteristics of the coal and steel industry, 
but without leaving the resolution of the problems flowing therefrom to 
industrial self-government. The Treaty vests exclusive authority to combat 
crises, which may arise from severe fluctuations of supply and demand, in 
Community institutions. Presently there is a crisis created by a decline of 
demand. The resulting excess capacity may lead to a kind of price competi-
tion, which in turn may be regarded as endangering the achievement of 
Community goals. The instrumentality of the Treaty is tailored to these 
problems. Primarily, the general provisions in article 60 concerning price 
are intended to prevent a deterioration of price competition. The system of 
setting prices in article 60 takes into account the historical and economic 
peculiarities of the pricing system in the steel market, and should foster the 
development of an ordered and, in important respects, limited price 
competition. 30 
Should these provisions, in the event of a manifest crisis, prove insuffi-
cient to bring about the pricing structure intended by the Treaty, then the 
Commission is entitled to establish minimum prices under article 61. In so 
doing, however, it must consider the competitive capabilities of the relevant 
firms and the principles stated in article 3(c). If these measures likewise 
prove insufficient, article 58(1) obligates the Commission to establish a sys-
tem of production quotas.31 
Quantitative restrictions in production do not render minimum prices 
unnecessary. They may remain necessary to prevent prices from falling be-
low the level defined by article 3(c). An economic analysis of this relation-
ship provides confirmation: 
The restriction of the output of unrefined steel erects barriers to a price 
collapse through the vehicle of a supply shortage, but whether it is possible 
to prevent prices from falling below a level where the proceeds per ton 
28. See, e.g., E. ScHMALENBACH, DER FREIEN WIRTSCHAFr ZUM GEDACHTNIS (1949); J. 
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (5th ed. 1976). 
29. See, e.g., OphUls, Juristische Grundgedanken des Schumanplans, 4 NJW 289, 291 
(1951). 
30. See Mestm!!cker, Das Verbot von Preisdiskriminierungen im Recht der Europaischen 
Gemeinschafl fiJr Kohle und Stahl, in 1 KAR TELLE UND MONOPOLE IM MODERNEN RECHT 309 
(1961) (with English translation). 
31. The Commission instituted production quotas in October, 1980, under a system by 
which it determines appropriate production levels for individual undertakings on a quarterly 
basis. The regulation includes all steel undertakings within the meaning of article 80, with the 
exception of small producers. Commission Decision 2794/80/ECSC, establishing a system of 
steel production quotas for undertakings in the iron and steel industry, 23 O.J. EUR, COMM, 
(No. L 291) 1 (Oct. 31, 1980). 
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cover more than mere variable costs, only the purchasers can decide. What 
the steel industry needs is a minimum sales level at minimum prices. Because 
of the special characteristics of its cost structure, these minimum sales must 
permit a relatively high capacity utilization .32 
The rules of the Treaty leave no doubt that, during a manifest crisis, the 
Community institutions are not authorized to disregard application of the 
cartel prohibition if they do not avail themselves of the possibility of estab-
lishing minimum prices. This result is confirmed by the following decision 
of the Court of Justice. 
B. Article 95(3) 
In 1961, the High Authority and the Council proposed a revision of the 
Treaty pursuant to article 95(3). The revision would have granted the High 
Authority the power to approve anticompetitive agreements within the 
meaning of article 65(1) whenever these agreements "are capable of achiev-
ing objectives of adaptation which the High Authority finds appropriate" 
and "are essential in order to attain those objectives and are not more re-
strictive than is necessary for that purpose."33 This new authorization for 
cartels should have been accompanied by additional controls to prevent 
abuse. The proposal was based on the structural crisis, which, in the case of 
the coal market, was a result of the steady substitution of oil for coal. The 
Court of Justice, in an opinion required under article 95(4), held that any 
amendment must precisely describe the nature of those agreements which 
could be authorized and must clearly describe the goal to be achieved by 
them: 
[O]therwise it would constitute not the adaptation of the exercise of a 
power already conferred upon the High Authority within the limits of the 
derogations allowed by Article 65 (2) but the grant of power without de-
fined limits, and thus of such a vast and indefinite extension of its existing 
powers, as to amount to an alteration not only in the extent but in the 
nature of those powers, in other words, to a new power. 34 
The Court of Justice determined that the proposed amendment did not sat-
isfy these requirements. 
The Court held that the proposed amendment exceeded the mere adap-
tation of the High Authority's powers and, due to its vagueness, made it 
impossible to determine whether it interfered with the provisions of articles 
2, 3 and 4.35 The absolute limits of any amendment to the Treaty under 
article 95(3), which stem from article 4( d) in conjunction with article 
65(2)(c), have been referred to previously. The Court of Justice equated the 
objective criterion of article 65(2)(c) with article 4(d): a violation of article 
4( d) is always produced if a cartel controls a substantial part of the produc-
tion of the Comm.on Market.36 Hence, through its encouragement of, and 
32. H. JORGENSEN, supra note 26, at 104 (emphasis in original). [Author's translation. -
Ed.] 
33. Proposed Amendment to Article 65 of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and 
Steel Community, Advisory Opinion No. 1/61, 1961 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 243, 243. 
34. 1961 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 258. 
35. 1961 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 259. 
36. 1961 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 262. 
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acquiescence in, price agreements among steel undertakings, the Commis-
sion had taken on an authority that could not be based upon revision of the 
Treaty under the provisions of article 95(3). 
C. Price-fixing Agreements and Minimum Prices 
The manifest crisis, so declared by the Community institutions, justifies 
the establishment of minimum prices under article 61. The Commission 
has, however, recommended price increases. This recommendation has the 
discernible purpose of retroactively legitimizing price increases founded on 
agreements among steel undertakings. 
This section of the present Article will examine whether the Community 
institutions were justified in foregoing the minimum price regulation called 
for by the Treaty in favor of tolerating and recommending price-fixing 
agreements. The Commission recommendations reflect an orientation to-
wards the price level established by these price agreements. The explana-
tion of Commission Member Graf Davignon appears to be based on this 
view of the law: The Commission had not left the steel undertakings a free 
hand in the establishment of prices; rather, the Commission decided on 
price increases only after discussion with undertakings and users.37 
Price-fixing agreements, even those entered into with the cooperation of 
the Commission, are not an appropriate substitute for the minimum price 
regulation foreseen by the Treaty. Such "voluntary" measures by steel pro-
ducers may not, within the system of the Treaty, be justified as being a less 
restrictive measure than official regulation. The previously discussed 
mandatory character of the powers of the Community institutions supports 
this. 
Furthermore, such measures are not compatible with the procedural 
and substantive rules that, under the Treaty, apply to minimum price regu-
lation. Article 61(1) lists, among the preconditions to the establishment of 
minimum prices, an investigation by the Commission with the participation 
of the undertakings and their associations, in accordance with the first para-
graph of article 46, and the third paragraph of article 48.38 The interests of 
users are to be taken into consideration in these investigations. Prior to 
37. Protocol of the Consultative Co=ittee of the ECSC, Document no. 9394-81, Nov. 16, 
198 I, at 2 EN/ks. 
38. Art. 46 of the ECSC Treaty, supra note 2, provides in part: 
The High Authority may at any time consult Governments, the various parties con-
cerned (undertakings, workers, consumers and dealers) and their associations, and any 
experts. 
To provide guidance, in line with the tasks assigned to the Community, on the course 
of action to be followed by all concerned, and to determine its own course of action, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, the High Authority shall, in consultation as 
provided above: 
I. conduct a continuous study of market and price trends . . . . 
Art. 48 of the ECSC Treaty, supra note 2, provides in part: 
To obtain information which it requires, or to facilitate the performance of the tasks 
entrusted to it, the High Authority shall normally call upon producers' associations on 
condition either that they provide for accredited representatives of workers and consum-
ers to sit on their governing bodies or on advisory committees attached to them, or that 
they make satisfactory provision in some other way in their organisation for the interests 
of workers and consumers to be voiced. 
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instituting price measures, the advice of the Consultative Committee and 
the Council must be obtained. The hearings should deal with the necessity 
of the proposed measures and the price level to be established. The Com-
mission may establish minimum prices on this basis for any part of produc-
tion falling within its jurisdiction, if such action is required to achieve the 
goals of article 3. 
Above all, in establishing prices, the Commission must ensure "that the 
coal and steel industries and the consumer industries remain competitive, in 
accordance with the principles laid down in Article 3(c)."39 This reference 
does not merely repeat the goal of article 3, as discussed previously. 
Rather, the substantive principles applying to the pricing policy of the 
Community under article 3(c) are extended to the user industries. The 
prices established by the Community institutions must not, therefore, per-
mit only steel undertakings to make the necessary amortization and earn a 
normal rate of return on invested capital. This same right also attaches to 
those consumer industries affected by the pricing system. Article 61(2), in 
conjunction with article 3(c), gives to the establishment of prices a function 
similar to that of the discrimination prohibition of article 3(b), namely to 
ensure equal production access to all similarly situated users. 
The Commission recommendations to increase steel prices may not be 
justified on a procedural or substantive basis as an implied establishment of 
minimum prices. Price agreements entered into with the Commission's en-
couragement and supported by official Commission communications can-
not guarantee for steel users the same level of protection as the scheme 
provided by the Treaty. In this regard, it is irrelevant whether the steel-user 
industries have standing to sue under the Treaty. The resort to price agree-
ments deprives the steel users of the protection of the Treaty. In exercising 
its discretion to set prices, the Commission is limited by considerations of 
differing cost structures among steel undertakings. The Treaty gives af-
fected undertakings the opportunity to protect their own interests through 
judicial review of the Commission's decisions. The final determining factor 
is that the detailed and fundamental decision of the ECSC Treaty against 
market regulation by cartels and in favor of judicially reviewable, govern-
mental regulation would be rendered meaningless if the procedures laid 
down in the Treaty were not followed. 
After the conclusion of the Treaty, critics of the partial integration of the 
coal and steel markets were met squarely with the argument that the Treaty 
created a governmentally controlled competition system, and not a super-
cartel. In the words of one of the leading officials of the Coal and Steel 
Community: 
[I]t is certainly incorrect to characterize this economic system as a 
super-cartel. The Coal and Steel Community is neither a voluntary nor an 
involuntary cartel. There are fundamental differences. Members of a car-
tel determine the activities of the market, as a rule not only for the duration 
of a crisis but indefinitely. Cartels may be called "children of distress" but 
as a rule they continue even after the crisis is over. On the other hand, in 
the Coal and Steel Community it is not the undertakings which influence 
the market through cartel-like ties. This power belongs to a supranational 
39. ECSC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 61(2). 
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authority which only interferes when this becomes necessary in light of an 
extraordinary occurrence (crise manifeste or penurie). Its power to inter-
vene is limited to a minimum when compared to the level of national eco-
nomic interference which has until now existed.40 
This legal interpretation is supported, nearly without exception, in the liter-
ature on the subject: 
Only the institutions of the Community are authorized to interfere with 
economic activity, and they may, only temporarily and under exceptional 
circumstances, limit competition to a reduced or nonexistent role. Under-
takings never have the right to restrict competition, not even in order to 
contribute to the achievement of Community goals. Only in cases ap-
proved of and controlled by the High Authority can cartels organize and 
operate. Even when competition is limited or eliminated through the inter-
ference of the Community institutions, undertakings are not exempted 
from the prohibition of Articles 4 and 65, and may not create illegal 
cartels.41 
IV. RESTRICTIONS OF NORMAL COMPETITIVE CONDITIONS 
A. The Objective ef the Treaty's "Normal Competitive Conditions" 
A goal of article 65(1), in conjunction with article 5, is to ensure "nor-
mal competitive conditions." Commentators have attempted to formulate 
the necessary preconditions for this concept to guide the application of the 
cartel prohibition. Some have argued that normal competitive conditions 
occur only when there is an approximate equilibrium of supply and de-
mand.42 Even disregarding the difficulties inherent in this concept of equi-
librium, it is incompatible with the Treaty. The equilibrium of supply and 
demand is not a precondition to competition; rather, equilibrium is to be 
brought about by competition. The Treaty aims to facilitate this process 
through rules on competition. 
Other commentators posit an analysis based on an inquiry into whether 
competition existed before the conclusion of the anticompetitive agreements 
and, if so, in what form. Under this view, "normal competitive conditions," 
or those conditions capable of being restricted, do not exist when important 
functions of the economy can be performed only through concerted activi-
ties of undertakings or when "the classic tool of competition, a free, market-
determined pricing structure, cannot operate due to political or other rea-
sons."43 This opinion, likewise, cannot be accepted. To do so would leave 
the legality of price agreements to the discretion of the Community institu-
tions or to that of the undertakings. It has already been argued that such an 
interpretation would be incompatible with the mandatory regulatory au-
thority vested in the Community institutions. 
40. R. KRAWIELICKI, DAS MONOPOLVERBOT IM SCHUMANPLAN 5 (1952). [Author's trans-
lation. - Ed.) 
41. Jaeger, supra note 13, at 15. [Author's translation. - Ed.] 
42. E.g., Kronstein, l)ie Bedeutung der Wellbewerbsregeln im Gesamtra/1men des 
Montanvertrages und des Ver/rages fiber die Europaische Wirtschaflsgemeinschaft, in 1 
KARTELLE UND MONOPOLE IM MoDERNEN RECHT 111, 116 (1960). 
43. Von Simson, Nichtanwendung aef Montanunionsvertrag, in GEMEINSCHAFTSKOM• 
MENTAR, supra note 10, at § 101 Nr. 3, at i 27 (2d ed. 1963). (Author's translation. - Ed.] 
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Under an appropriate interpretation, "normal competitive conditions" 
are those conditions that the application of, and compliance with, the provi-
sions of the ECSC Treaty would produce.44 This characterization of the 
concept of competition is necessary, because the Treaty takes into account 
peculiarities of the coal and steel industry that modify the free play of com-
petition significantly. An initial indication of these peculiarities that flow 
from the concept of normal competitive conditions is that agreements in-
tended to prevent unfair competition within the meaning of article 60(1) do 
not violate article 65. For a more specific definition of that competition 
which is "normal" within the meaning of the Treaty, economic and norma-
tive peculiarities must be considered. 
B. Economic Peculiarities of Normal Competitive Conditions 
The market for unrefined and semi-finished steel products is character-
ized by the existence of a few large suppliers and a distinctive oligopolistic 
structure. In 1965, the fifteen largest steel producers of the ECSC produced 
61.4 percent of the steel produced in the Community.45 (German undertak-
ings were responsible for about one-half of this production.46) A progres-
sive consolidation of the oligopoly enjoyed by these fifteen firms produced, 
by 1976, a market share of 72.4 percent or, if affiliated concerns are taken 
into account, 87.4 percent.47 The Commission did not fail to appreciate the 
dangers of this concentration. In spite of this market structure, however, 
the Commission considered price competition to be workable, so long as no 
undertaking commanded a production share greater than twelve to thirteen 
percent.48 
On this basis, the Commission's industrial policy aimed at the compati-
bility of the oligopolistic supply structure, caused by technical and financial 
conditions, with the maintenance of effective competition. Competition, 
and above all price competition, was supposed to be the most important 
regulator in maintaining the pressure toward cost minimi7:ation. Although 
the previously cited policy statement recognizes the necessity of permitting 
mergers in the interest of the international competitiveness of the European 
steel industry, it endorses an anti-cartel policy: 
Effective competition between these undertakings and groups of undertak-
ings cannot fully develop to the extent that cartel agreements are entered 
into. Under these conditions it becomes essential to the maintenance of 
effective competition that a sufficient number of independent firms be pre-
served through the inhibition of the natural tendency towards the mutual 
coordination of market behavior and through the preservation of a certain 
unforeseeability regarding the respective reactions of producers to the ac-
44. See Jaeger, supra note 13, at 59. 
45. D. FOCK, DIE OLIG0P0LE DER STAHLINDUSTRIE IN DER M0NTANUNION 41 (1967). 
46. Id at 40. 
47. W. FEURING, ZUSAMMENSCHLUSSKONTROLLE IN DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT 
FOR KOHLE UND STAHL 75-76 (1980). 
48. See Ko=ission, Grundzuge einer Wettbewerbspolitik hinsichtlich der Strukturen der 
Stahlindustrie, Amtsblatt C 12, 5, 7, Jan. 1, 1970. For details, see E. MESTMACKER, 
EUROPAISCHES WETTBEWERBSRECHT 79-81. 
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tions of any one of them.49 
This position did not change in the course of the following year, as the 
Community sought its way out of the crisis by financing industrial restruc-
turing. Even recently, when the steel crisis had already grown to its present 
dimensions, the Commission levied civil penalties under article 65 against 
French and German producers of refined steel to inhibit price agreements, 
notwithstanding the difficult financial situation of the relevant firms.so The 
Commission argued that the Community institutions alone bear responsi-
bility for the resolution of the crisis. The firms, opined the Commission, 
may not supplement Commission measures against the crisis by entering 
into agreements on their own or illegally regulating the market. This prohi-
bition, according to the Commission, was particularly important to secure a 
fair degree of protection for users. 
It appears that the Community institutions, until the consummation of 
the current price agreements, viewed the protection of competition as an 
important and integral part of their policy of working towards the Treaty's 
goals. The economic peculiarities of the steel market, in particular its 
oligopolistic structure, certainly facilitate the restriction of competition. 
However, these peculiarities do not preclude "normal competitive condi-
tions" within the meaning of article 65. 
C. Normative Peculiarities of Normal Competitive Conditions: Compulsory 
Price Lists and Prohibition Against .Discrimination 
The discrimination prohibition of article 60, the duty of steel undertak-
ings to publish a price list, and the requirement that the actual prices con-
form to the published list, modify competitive conditions in the steel 
market. The requirement of compliance with the published price affects 
competition, as do arrangements for open prices, and contributes to "con-
scious parallelism" in the behavior of undertakings. Competition is further 
modified by the requirement of choosing and adhering to a certain basing 
point.SI 
The Commission's decision of July 3, 1981, strengthened these effects by 
extending the provisions of price publication and nondiscrimination to steel 
distributors.s2 The system of price ·setting under article 60 is a part of the 
normal competitive conditions. However, the resulting reduction in price 
49. Korn.mission, supra note 48, at 6. [Author's translation. - Ed.] 
50. See BULL. EUR. COMM., No. 3, 1980, at 31; 10 BERICHT OBER DIE WETTBEWERBSPOLI· 
TIK DER KoMMISSION 1980, at 109-10 (1981). The undertakings had entered into quota agree-
ments covering the majority of finished steel products during the years 1971 to 1975, and had 
entered into similar agreements governing price during the years 1973 to 1975. 
51. See Knopfie, supra note 10, at ~ 16; see also E. ZIMMERMANN, DIE PREISDJS• 
KRIMINIERUNG IM RECHT DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFI' FUR KOHLE UND STAHL 122-
41 (Schriften des Institutes fOr Ausl!!ndisches und Intemationales Wirtschaftsrecht, Bd. 16, 
1965); Bomer, JJiskriminierungen und Subventionen, in ZEHN JAHRE RECHTSPRECHUNO DES 
GERICHTSHOFS DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN 216 (KOlner Schriften zum 
Europarecht, Bd. I, 1965); Mestm!icker, JJiskriminierungen, JJirigismus und Wettbewerb (pts. 
1-2), 7 WuW 21, 92 (1957); Mestmlicker, supra note 30. 
52. Commission Decision 81/1836/EEC, on the obligation of distributive undertakings to 
publish price-lists and conditions of sale and on practices prohibited for these undertakings, 24 
O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 184) 13, 13-14 (July 4, 1981). 
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competition does not foreclose application of article 65. To the contrary, the 
cartel prohibition remains unaffected, along with the discrimination prohi-
bition, and serves to protect the remaining competition.53 
However, when viewed in connection with the official tolerance of price 
agreements, article 60 takes on an entirely different meaning, one inconsis-
tent with its very purpose. The particularly strict application of article 60, 
announced by the Commission in its Communication of November 14, 
1981,54 and the sanctions to be imposed against violators, lead to the con-
clusion that the Commission is using its power to supervise an illegal cartel. 
If the participating undertakings have published their price lists in accor-
dance with price agreements, then the application of article 60 leads to the 
preclusion of all price competition. This application of article 60 secures 
the compliance with price agreements more effectively than would cartel 
measures against "chiseling" members. 
D. Normative Peculiarities of Normal Competitive Conditions: Production 
Quotas 
The ECSC Treaty contains no provision that precludes the application 
of article 65 to the Commission's establishment of production quotas under 
article 58. This section will examine whether the policy basis for instituting 
the quota system precludes the application of the cartel prohibition, be-
cause normal competitive conditions, under a system of quotas, are no 
longer possible. 
The imposition of quotas restricts the quantitative supply of the affected 
products. Quotas are established for individual undertakings to prevent in-
creases in market share at the expense of competitors. The burdens of the 
resulting decrease in production are to be borne equally. In this manner, 
the tendency towards "ruinous competition" due to excess capacity is mini-
mized. Price competition is thereby not precluded, but merely limited. The 
corresponding connection between quantitative restrictions and minimum 
prices has been referred to previously.55 
In its Communication of November 14, 1981, the Commission posited 
that price competition remains possible despite the imposition of quotas.56 
The Court of Justice emphasized that the Treaty required the Commission 
to consider the objectives of articles 2, 3 and 4 in its imposition of quotas. 
These objectives include the protection of competition.57 
It follows from the above that the imposition of quotas alone does not 
foreclose normal competitive conditions. The Court of Justice confirmed 
this result in its holdings on similar issues in the area of Community agri-
53. See Mining Undertakings of the Ruhr Basin (Geitling) v. High Authority of the ECSC 
(Case No. 2/56), 1957 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 3, 20; France v. High Authority of the ECSC 
(Case No. 1/54), 1954 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1, 9; Groupement des Industries Siderurgiques 
Luxembourgeoises v. High Authority of the ECSC (Nos. 7, 9/54), 1956 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 
175, 198. 
54. See 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 294) 3 (Nov. 14, 1981). 
55. See note 32 supra and accompanying text. 
56. See 24 0.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 294) 3 (Nov. 14, 1981). 
51. See S.p.A. Ferriera Valsabbia v. Commission of the Eur. Co=unities (Case No. 
154/78), 1980 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 907, 1009. 
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cultural law.58 In these cases, Member States exercised their authority to 
set minimum and maximum production quotas for individual sugar 
producers within their respective regions. The plaintiffs alleged that this 
concerted market organization entirely precluded effective competition. 
Consequently, they argued, all rules directed against the restriction of com-
petition should be invalid. The Court of Justice did not accept this 
argument: 
Whatever criticisms may be made of a system, which is designed to consol-
idate a partitioning of national markets by means of national quotas, the 
effects of which will be examined later, the fact remains that if it leaves in 
practice a residual field of competition, that field comes within the provi-
sions of the rules of competition. 59 
In conclusion, it becomes clear that the measures taken by the Commu-
nity institutions against the "manifest crisis" do not preclude the applicabil-
ity of article 65 to price agreements. 
58. See Maizena GmbH v. Council of the Eur. Communities (Case No. 139/79), 1980 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3393; Col:lperatieve vereniging 'Suiker Unie' v. Commission of the Eur. 
Communities (Case No. 40/73), 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1663. 
59. Col:lperatieve Vereniging 'Suiker Unie' v. Commission of the Eur. Communities (Case 
No. 40/73), 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1663, 1915. In agreement is the language of the Court 
of Justice in the Isoglucose decision: ''These measures [of production limitation] moreover 
permit some competition to continue in respect of price, terms of sale and quantity of 
isoglucose." Maizena GmbH v. Council of the Eur. Communities (Case No. 139/79), 1980 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3393, 3422. 
